Charles Ungerleider, Professor Emeritus, The University of British Columbia
On Thursday, September 17th,
the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (BCTF) sought the assistance of the
Labour Relations Board of British Columbia (LRBBC). The BCTF wanted the LRBBC’s
help “in addressing the serious and growing concerns that teachers have about
the working and learning conditions in the public education system during the
COVID-19 Pandemic.” Central to the BCTF’s argument is the fragmented
application of provincial guidelines by school boards in the province.
The BCTF asserts that its application falls within the LRBBC’s mandate under section 88 of the Labour Relations Code. That section reads:
If a difference arises during the term of a collective agreement, and in the board's opinion delay has occurred in settling it or it is a source of industrial unrest between the parties, the board may, on application by either party to the difference, or on its own motion,
(a) inquire
into the difference and make recommendations for settlement, and
(b) if
the difference is arbitrable, order that it be immediately submitted to a
specified stage or step in the grievance procedure under the collective
agreement or, whether or not the difference is arbitrable, request the minister
to appoint a special officer. (Labour Relations Code [RSBC 1996] Chapter 244
I am not a lawyer with expertise in
labour relations. I do not know how the LRBBC will respond, but I hope that the
genuine concerns of teachers about their health and safety are addressed by the
time you read this blog post.
Regardless of the outcome, the dispute itself exposes a serious weakness in what we informally describe as British Columbia’s education “system.” I place quotation marks around the word system because the issue raises an important question that all systems must face: How much and what kind of authority and responsibility should be delegated from the main body (in this case the provincial ministry of education) to regional entities (in this case school boards) and still remain a system?
The BCTF’s petition to the LRBBC argues that the provincial health and safety guidelines have been interpreted and applied inconsistently across the province, and those inconsistencies put some of their members at greater risk than others without adequate reason or justification.
A word sometimes used to describe the relationship between the Ministry of Education and school boards is co-governance. It is a relationship described in a 2018 memorandum of understanding between the British Columbia Ministry of Education and the British Columbia School Trustees Association which uses co-governance in the following manner:
The Province recognizes that
BCSTA, as the representative voice for its members and Board of Education, is a
key partner in developing and maintaining an effective education system, and
further recognizes the legislated co-governance role of Boards of Education to
determine local education priorities.
Notwithstanding the language of
co-governance, the
British North America Act (1867) gave the provinces the sole authority for
making laws about education. The provinces, in turn, created strong centralized
departments of education to oversee school boards, themselves creations of the provincial
governments.
Asserting the co-governance role of boards of education and encouraging or allowing boards to determine how a
provincial guideline is implemented introduces the potential for misalignment
between local application and the intended purpose of the guideline. The
implication of guidelines is that they are recommendations about best or
preferred practice. As is asserted by the BCTF, co-governance has compromised the
implementation of the guidelines by allowing boards to exercise their delegated
authority.
To delegate authority and
responsibility to a subordinate unit, one must have confidence that the unit
has the capacity to exercise the delegated authority and responsibility. Co-governance
gives both the Ministry of Education and local school boards a shield that
either can wield depending upon the situation at hand. The assumption of
co-governance is also based on the notion that local authorities will know how
best to apply X (whatever X might be) because they are more closely attuned to
local conditions.
When school boards seek greater discretion in the allocation of funds provided by the Ministry of Education, they assert that claim of knowing local conditions best. But, when school boards say they do not have enough resources for X (whatever X might be), the Ministry of Education says that the formula it uses for allocation funding is a distribution mechanism, not a spending mechanism. The Ministry will remind boards that they have the discretion for using the resources they receive.
Co-governance is a convenient shield, but poor policy. It is a poor policy, in part, because it is predicated on the assumption that there is sufficient capacity in all the units to which discretion has been delegated.
There are sixty school boards in British Columbia to which considerable authority and responsibility have been delegated. Previous governments have already made the judgment that in matters of teacher bargaining, individual school boards have, at best, limited capacity. Therefore, government established the British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association (BCPSEA) to bargain collectively with the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation.
For its part, the BCTF would prefer local bargaining precisely because of differences in capacity among boards. Prior to provincial bargaining, the BCTF exploited differences among boards to its advantage. The BCTF centrally managed the bargaining between BCTF locals and local school boards. It strategically selected school boards that it knew were more favorably disposed to its arguments or that lacked the capacity to resist its arguments. By establishing local agreements favourable to its interests with such boards, the BCTF successfully used those agreements as a baseline for its negotiation with other boards.
With respect to the health and safety issues about which the BCTF is now concerned, it seeks a provincial solution to the local differences. I am sympathetic to the concerns expressed by the BCTF about the health and safety of its members, and hope they are resolved quickly.
My sentiments extend beyond the immediate problem to the larger issue of delegated authority. I see the issue in the larger context of the question I raised earlier: How much and what kind of authority and responsibility should be delegated from a provincial ministry of education to school boards?